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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, Salt Lake ) 
City Corporation, ) REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Case No. 880401-CA 
) Priority II 
vs. ) 
JON B. BUXTON, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c) (1953 as amended) and Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) whereby a 
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from a final judgment of conviction of 
a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court. Final judgment 
and conviction were rendered by the Honorable Judge Paul G. 
Grant, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the 
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for 
Count I, Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Section 105 of the Salt Lake City Traffic 
Code (1984); Count II, Obedience to Semaphore at Crosswalk, 
an infraction, in violation of Section 084 of the Salt Lake 
City Traffic Code (1984); and Count III, Open Container in 
Vehicle, an infraction, in violation of Section 109 of the 
Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984). The 
defendant/appellant, represented by his attorney of records, 
Charles F. Loyd, Jr., was found guilty through a jury trial. 
The court sentenced the defendant on Count I to 180 days 
jail and $1100.00 fines and fees, with 170 days jail 
suspended upon twelve months probation to the court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant-Buxtonfs Statement of Issues are inadequate; 
therefore, the plaintiff-City frames the issues as follows: 
1. Does Utah law, regarding driving under the 
influence of alcohol, create an obligation on the arresting 
Officer to inform the charged drunk driver of a right to 
have an independent chemical test? 
2. If such an obligation to inform an arrested person 
of his discretionary right to have an independent chemical 
test exists, does the failure to inform an arrested person 
require the suppression of an otherwise valid admissible 
intoxilyzer test? 
3. In Utah, is it a defense to the crime of driving 
under the influence of alcohol that if the arrested drunk 
driver alleges he was driving as a matter "necessity" 
because he was driving an ill friend to the hospital? 
4. If the affirmative "necessity" defense to a 
criminal charge exists in Utah, must a trial judge submit 
that issue to the jury when the criminal defendant has 
failed to present any credible evidence: 
(a) That there existed no reasonable alternative 
to driving under the influence; and 
(b) The risk of drunk driving exceeded the risk 
sought to be avoided? 
5. Does the "Harmless Error" principle bar defendant-
Buxtonfs claim? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
18-1-702 Colo, Rev. Statutes (1973) 
(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of 
section 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining justifiable use of 
physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct 
which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable 
and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency 
measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which 
is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or 
developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of 
sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of 
intelligence and morality the desirability and urgency of 
avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of 
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute 
defining the offense in issue. 
(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under 
subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon 
considerations pertaining only to the morality and 
advisability of the statute, either in its general 
application or with respect to its application to a 
particular class of cases arising thereunder. When evidence 
relating to the defense of justification under this section 
is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the 
consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a 
matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances 
would, of established, constitute a justification. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V, Section 1. 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall 
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, 
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.10. 
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug— 
Number of tests--Refusal--Warning report—Hearing, 
revocation of license--Appeal--Person incapable of refusal-
Results of test available—Who may give test—Evidence. 
(6)(a) The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice administer a 
chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered 
at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional 
test does not affect admissibility of the results of the 
test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or 
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the 
test or tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-105. 
Common law crimes abolished.--Common law crimes are 
abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this 
code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-302. Compulsion.--
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in 
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by 
the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical 
force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would 
not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section 
shall be unavailable to a person who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a situation in 
which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled by reason of the 
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or 
to any defense of compulsion except as in subsection (1) 
provided. 
Utah Code Annotated, 76-2-401(5) 
Justification as defense—When allowed.--Conduct which 
is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense 
based on the conduct. The defense of justification may be 
claimed: 
• * * 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any 
other reason under the laws of this state. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The Implied Consent Law, Section 41-6-44.10 
of the Utah Code does not create a right to be informed of 
an independent chemical test in a criminal proceeding. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to 
suppress the defendant's intoxilyzer test. 
POINT II. The defendant, in a criminal proceeding for 
DUI, does not have a right to be informed of the 
availability of an independent chemical test and, therefore, 
failure to inform the defendant of this right does not 
require the suppression of the alleged defendant's 
intoxilyzer test. 
POINT III. Utah law does not recognize the defense of 
"necessity"; that is, an intoxicated driver is not excused 
from criminal culpability because he chose voluntarily to 
drive an ill person to the hospital. If such a defense is 
to be created, it should be done by the legislature and not 
judicial fiat. 
In Utah, the legislature specifically omitted adopting 
the model criminal code providing for such a defense. Thus, 
if any common law affirmative defense existed, it was 
modified by the comprehensive scheme of criminal law adopted 
by the legislature. Further, this Court cannot reasonably 
construe the affirmative defenses in the statute regarding 
"justification" or "compulsion" to include a defense against 
the plain meaning and wording of the statutes. Therefore, 
this case should be affirmed and not remanded for a new 
trial. 
POINT IV. Even if Utah recognized the defense of 
"necessity," such defense is not automatically submitted to 
the jury. First, the trial court judge has an obligation to 
evaluate the evidence to assure that the prima facie 
elements of that defense have been established by the 
defendant. 
In the case at bar, the defendant failed to make such a 
prima facie showing; specifically, he failed to present 
credible evidence that there existed no reasonable 
alternative to driving under the influence. The unrebutted 
evidence clearly demonstrated that there were other sober 
drivers available, there were other ways of assisting the 
ill individual, such as phoning for emergency help or the 
defendant could have stopped at the nearest phone booth for 
assistance. 
Further, the elements of risk avoidance preponderated 
clearly in favor of non-drunk driving. The risk and damage 
to innumerable innocent drivers and pedestrians by 
defendant-Buxtonfs conduct far outweighed the benefit to be 
achieved in assisting the ill person to the hospital. 
Thus, two of the three essential elements were not 
established and the Judge properly excluded the defense from 
being submitted to the jury. 
POINT V. The evidence when viewed as a whole does not 
erode the confidence in the appropriateness of the jury 
conviction. The defendant has failed to present a case 
where a different outcome would be reasonably likely. Thus, 
any failure to instruct was harmless error, even if the 
defense of "necessity" is available in Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The fact, when viewed in a light most favorably to 
upholding the jury verdict are as follows: 
1. On February 13, 1988, Officer Kirk of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department observed a blue Chevette vehicle 
heading north on State Street in Salt Lake City at a high 
rate of speed. (R. 19.) Officer Kirk placed his motorcycle 
behind the vehicle and clocked the vehicle at 45 m.p.h. in a 
30 m.p.h. zone. (R. 20.) The vehicle ran a red light at 
600 South and State Street. (R. 20.) 
2. Officer Kirk testified that the traffic was very 
heavy and that there were numerous pedestrians present. (R. 
21. ) 
3. Officer Kirk pulled the vehicle over, approached 
the vehicle and bent down at the front driverf s window to 
question the driver. He noticed the odor or alcohol was 
strong on defendant-Buxton1s breath. (R. 22.) As Mr. 
Buxton exited the vehicle, Officer Kirk noticed his unsteady 
balance and slurred speech. (R. 22, 23.). 
4. Based upon these initial observations, Officer Kirk 
determined that the driver defendant-Buxton, may be driving 
under the influence of alcohol and asked him to submit to 
several field sobriety tests. Officer Kirk asked Mr. Buxton 
to perform a heel-to-toe test, a finger to nose test, a hand 
clap test and a finger count test. Mr. Buxton's performance 
on each of these tests was deemed to be unsatisfactory and 
the Officer believed that Mr. Buxton was under the influence 
of alcohol. (R. 24, 25.) 
5. The field sobriety tests, which Officer Kirk 
administered to defendant-Buxton were also observed by 
Officer Cheaver of the Salt Lake City Police Department. In 
Officer Cheaver's opinion, the defendant Buxton was driving 
under the influence of alcohol. (R. 38.) 
6. Officer Kirk placed defendant-Buxton under arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. Following that 
arrest, the Officer asked Mr. Buxton if he would consent to 
taking a breath test. Defendant-Buxton indicated that he 
would. (R. 27.) 
7. Officer Cheaver transported defendant-Buxton to the 
police station, where an intoxilyzer test was administered. 
The intoxilyzer test measured a breath-alcohol content on 
defendant's breath of ,202. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, R. 85.) 
8. During the police investigation, defendant-Buxton 
claimed he was driving as a matter of "necessity" or 
"justification;" that is, a friend became ill at a party and 
defendant was driving him to the hospital. However, the 
facts were undisputed that there were at least two sober 
individuals at the party, the host and a woman named Wanda. 
At least the host could have driven the ill person by 
leaving his children with the other adult person or the 
defendant. Alternatively, the host could have driven the 
ill person, with his two children to the hospital, in a safe 
and prudent manner. (R. 86, 87.) 
9. Defendant-Buxton elected to drive the ill person, 
but passed numerous phone booths on State Street prior to 
his arrest. Thus, he failed to stop and call for emergency 
assistance from an ambulance or the police, even though he 
had ample opportunity to do so. (R. 55; defendant's 
admission, R. 102.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE ANY CLAIM TO 
A RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE 
AVAILABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT CHEMICAL 
TEST IN THE APPEAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
CRIMINAL DUI TRIAL. 
A. THE ESSENCE OF EQUAL PROTECTION IS 
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION. THE 
DEFENDANT-BUXTON HAS FAILED TO 
DEMONSTRATE AN IRRATIONAL, 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS 
CLASSIFICATION TO RAISE AN EQUAL 
PROTECTION ARGUMENT. 
The Utah statute permitting an arrested person to have 
an independent chemical test, at his own expense, was 
expressly premised on the legislative determination that 
such a test or the failure to take a test would not affect 
the admissibility of the government test. The law expressly 
states: 
The failure or inability to obtain the 
additional test does not affect admissibility 
of the results of the test or tests taken at 
the direction of a peace officer, or preclude 
or delay these tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
41-6-44.10(6)(b) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended.) 
Defendant-Buxton seeks to avoid this clear legislative 
statement barring an exclusionary rule by invoking the catch 
words of "equal protection". The defendant incorrectly 
suggests some invidious discrimination between classes of 
individuals by suggesting that, even though no duty to give 
notice may be required under the Utah statute, one must be 
inferred because notice is given as part of an inducement to 
encourage those who have refused to submit to the test to do 
so. 
Buxton's Brief, at p. 6-7. 
In making this assertion, defendant-Buxtonfs Brief is 
conspicuously lacking of any rationale as to how defendant-
Buxton or any other person is prejudiced. It also lacks any 
analysis as to why a class of individuals, who submit to the 
test, are similarly situated to those who refuse and need 
encouragement to take the breathalyzer, so they will not 
lose their driving privileges for a year. 
On the issue of classification, our Court has observed: 
Discrimination is the essence of 
classification and does violence to the 
Constitution only when the balance upon which 
it is founded is unreasonable. . . . Our 
function is to determine whether an enactment 
operates equally on all persons similarly 
situated. . . . If it does not, then a 
differentiation would be without a reasonable 
basis . . . 
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160 
(Utah 1949); see Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 
1037 (Utah 1975). 
It is somewhat difficult to discuss the issue of 
reasonable classifications when defendant-Buxton, in 
challenging the classification, has not even addressed the 
matter. However, the Court's attention is drawn to several 
obvious justifications for treating those who voluntarily 
submit to a test, as required by law, differently from those 
who initially are reticent to comply or refuse. 
First, it must be noted that this process treats all 
persons who are similarly situated the same; that is, all 
persons who initially refuse to submit to the test are given 
the standard warning. This admonition advises them of the 
civil consequences of losing their driving privileges for 
one year. Further, as an inducement to these intransigent 
individuals, they are informed that they may have their own 
physicians conduct a test, so long as this second test 
results in no delay in the administration of the official 
3 
test. 
Obviously, one purpose of this standard admonition is 
to verify compliance with the State law regarding 
documentation of a refusal, so that the civil procedure of 
revoking a license for a year can be established. See 
Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 449, 351 (Utah 1979). Another 
obvious purpose is to encourage compliance with testing 
requests and the concerns that may be in the minds of 
inebriated individuals. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court can take 
judicial notice that, after arrest for driving under the 
influence and an initial refusal, many inebriated 
individuals are nervous, hostile, not operating at peak 
rationality, and suspicious of submitting to tests. Such 
assurances of the availability of private testing is 
rationally related to a legitimate government objective of 
encouraging compliance. 
2 
See DUI report form, attached as Appendix A, at page 2 
thereof. 
3 
See full text of the notice annexed as Appendix "A". 
On the other hand, those who submit to the test 
voluntarily and without objection, constitute a separate 
classification. They simply are not in need of the 
encouragement and assistance required for those who refuse, 
in order to obtain the law's objective: submission to the 
alcohol testing. 
Buxton has ignored the law's purpose and objective 
encouraging compliance. He, thereby, has attempted to turn 
it on its head by implicitly arguing the law's purpose is to 
give "all" arrestees notice of this option to have a second 
private test and manufacture out of whole cloth an equal 
protection argument. However, when viewed in light of the 
law's clear purpose and intent, Mr. Buxton's classification 
argument fails because all similarly situated persons are 
treated identically. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that defendant's 
implicit assumption that all arrestees are of one 
classification is erroneous. There exists a legitimate and 
rational basis to distinguish between cooperative 
individuals and those who do not initially agree to submit 
to an alcohol test. Further, it fulfills the express 
legislative directive that the optional private test does 
not affect the government's test admissibility. 
Defendant-Buxton has simply failed to carry his burden 
or persuasion to demonstrate that, even if the 
classification issue were relevant, it is arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable. Having failed, this equal 
protection claim should be dismissed. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVELY PERMITTED PRIVATE 
CHEMICAL TEST IS FOR PROTECTION OF 
CIVIL DRIVING PRIVILEGES; THERE-
FORE, IF ANY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
ARE INFERRED, THEY MAY ONLY BE 
RAISED IN A CIVIL LICENSE 
REVOCATION PROCEEDING AND DO NOT 
AFFECT CRIMINAL TRIALS. 
Even assuming arguendo that the provisions of the State 
statute give defendant a right to notice of his privileges 
to have an independent chemical test, that right may only be 
asserted in a civil proceeding held to determine the status 
of the defendant's driving privileges. Our courts made this 
clear in a case involving the claimed right to have counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment, before having blood (evidence) 
seized from his person. The Court construed this exact 
section under consideration by the Court and held: 
The foregoing statutory provisions [41-6-
44.10 U.C.A.], as they pertain to the implied 
consent matters, are obviously civil in 
nature as opposed to criminal, since they are 
devoid of criminal sanctions and provide only 
for the revocation of the privilege of 
operating a motor vehicle. 
Cavaness v. Cox, id. at p. 351. Thus, the Court ruled the 
provisions inapplicable to suppressing test results in a 
criminal proceeding. In analyzing this issue, the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: 
Applying the foregoing principles to the 
facts of this case, plaintiff has no standing 
to raise the question of the 
constitutionality since this case involves 
only a civil matter where neither the 
question of the right to counsel in a 
criminal case nor the question of 
admissibility of evidence as to the refusal 
or the results of a chemical test are at 
issue before the Court. 
Id. p. 352. 
Thus, any claimed right of notice to independent 
chemical test would, at best, only be applicable in a civil 
proceeding to determine the status of the defendant' s 
driver's license. Therefore, it is erroneous for the 
defendant to claim denial of his right to a notice in a 
civil proceeding as a basis of overturning the jury's 
verdict in this criminal case. 
POINT II. 
THE FAILURE TO INFORM A DEFENDANT OF A 
RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT CHEMICAL TEST IS 
NOT A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The defendant asserts that he was denied due process of 
law because he was not informed of his claimed "right" to 
have an independent chemical test. This position asserts 
that there is a right to an independent chemical test to the 
criminal DUI proceeding and that failure to inform this 
4 
defendant of that right was a denial of due process. 
Simply because a right exists, it is not incumbent that 
police officers inform the defendant of that right before 
proceeding with their investigation and arrest of the 
4 
Defendant-Buxton Brief, Point I, pp. 3-7.) 
defendant. The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) addressed the right of a 
defendant to be informed that he has a right to refuse a 
consensual search before his consent is obtained. The Court 
stated: 
One alternative that would go far toward 
proving that the subject of a search did know 
he had a right to refuse consent would be to 
advise him of that right before eliciting his 
consent. That, however, is a suggestion that 
has been almost universally repudiated by 
both federal and state courts, and, we think, 
rightly so. For it would be thoroughly 
impractical to impose on the normal consent 
search the detailed requirements of an 
effective warning. Consent searches are part 
of the standard investigatory techniques of 
law enforcement agencies. 
Id. p. 231. 
This same rational should be applied in the instant 
case. In Schneckloth the Supreme Court decided that the 
defendant did not need to be informed of his right to refuse 
a search. In the instant case, the defendant's consent to a 
search (obtaining body substances for chemical analysis of 
blood/alcohol content) had already been implied by the law. 
Informing him of his right to take an additional chemical 
test would have no legal impact on his decision to submit to 
the test requested by the officer. 
Rather, it is clear that this proposed police 
disclosure requirement would not alter his statutory duty to 
submit to the test or protect some inherent or express 
constitutional right, like the right to remain silent. It 
would not serve to ensure the reliability or validity of the 
police test. The scientific and legal foundation for 
admissibility are well established in law and do not include 
the necessity of a separate confirmatory test. See 41-6-
44.10(6)(b). 
Defendant-Buxton*s brief simply lacks credible 
rationale justifying his proposed procedural trap. Neither 
does he explain how it would in any way promote justice or 
advance the discovery of truth in a criminal proceeding. 
Admittedly, it would provide defense lawyers with a 
procedural loophole by creating mechanism to exclude 
otherwise relevant, material and admissible evidence. 
However, it would do so at great cost to justice. 
The exclusionary rule is a drastic and harsh remedy 
because it excludes relevant, material and otherwise 
admissible evidence. In fact, our legislature expressly 
stated it should not apply. 41-6-44.10(6)(b) Utah Code Ann. 
Consequently, it frequently results in the guilty 
individuals being freed to protect more important core 
constitutional rights. As such, it should be exercised only 
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to advance the most compelling public policy interests. 
Defendant-Buxton cited no case upholding his position and 
has failed to articulate any important societal and justice 
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 430 U.S. 388 
(1971) J. Burger Dissent p. 413-416. 
i s s i l e s . " I 111 1 ! in J • r e d s u i i » • i 11 JI it " 111 ' i | H r > i \ 1 o n 11 u 11 111 I 
rejected by this Court. 
Fv<?w' ^ v ^ -ii'riQfjinfjQi^ know *: • -e w r i t e r (which has 
consic-..; . .. • • • *•"• >< i j * " " 1 1 
trie Cour by def ervdant-Buxtc ' \ ? . ' c u t ' s r e f e rence , 
t h r e e T.a^-r ---r-? —~.~ discusrod b<->1 ^%': 
3 Jalxtornxa - . .. . n i.ourt h,i" 
addressed the issue of a defendant:4-. : ':r * to be Informed of 
- • : ,
 i :.- ,., ~ _ * . . h r _ . t e s t , Kesler ; 
Department ui Motor Vehxcli., J , < » .* .. J . i ib'1 I He: •-
the Court stated: 
Turning Uw u;;a second question ot whether or 
not respondent's refusal may be excused by 
reason of the failure of the arresting 
officer to advise respondent that he could 
obtain an additional test at his own expense, 
pursuant to section 13354, subdivision (b), 
we note that neither section 13353 or secti on 
13354 purports to require the arresting 
officer to advise the driver that an 
. additional test is available at his expense 
Other than the Miranda warning prior to 
police interrogation, section 13353 
subdivision (a)lf specifies the only warning 
required to be given, namely, that the driver 
Defendant cites People v. Koual, 124 N.W.2d 274 (Mich, 
1963) and State v. Creson, 576 P. 2d 814 (Or.Ct.App. Ic^8 ) in 
support of his contention that dismissal of the case c-r 
exclusion of the breath test results is the appropriate 
remedy for failure to inform a defendant of the availability 
of an independent alcohol test. Both of these cases are 
distinguishable because both involved state statutes which 
expressly required this notice to be given. The officers 
had not given the required notice and the courts therefore 
dismissed the case or suppressed the breath test results. 
Utah does i 10 t require notice of the independent test to be 
given and therefore these sanctions would be Inappropriate 
"be told that his failure to submit to such a 
chemical test will result in the suspension 
of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
for a period of six months." Therefore, we 
may reasonably conclude that the Legislature 
did not intend to impose the further 
requirement that the arresting officer advise 
the driver of the availability of an addition 
test at his own expense. . . . 
Nor do we believe that principles of due 
process or equity require that persons in 
respondent's position be advised by law 
enforcement officers that additional tests 
may be taken at their own expense. 
[A]11 that due process requires in the 
preservation of the rights of such persons is 
the availability of an opportunity for 
defendant to obtain a timely sampling of his 
blood in the manner required by law. 
7 
Id. p. 903 (Emphasis added). 
2. Alaska. The Supreme Court of Alaska has also 
addressed the issue of a defendant's right to be informed of 
the ability to take an independent chemical test. Palmer v. 
State of Alaska, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979). In this case, 
the defendant was convicted in an Alaska District Court of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. On appeal, the defendant argued that his 
conviction should be overturned and his breathalyzer test 
results should be suppressed because he was not informed of 
7 
California Code §13353-4 are verbally identical to §41-6-
44.10(6) Utah Code Ann., 1953 which allows a defendant to 
have an independent test and §41-6-44.10(2)(a) outlining the 
duty to warn a defendant of the consequences of a refusal. 
Neither requires police to inform a defendant of a right to 
have an independent chemical test. 
I l l ' , i i f j l t l l I i 1 ,111 j i ii I t ' ^ ( . M K I H I I l h i i i j l M M Ml i l« i M i i | i n t M i i n i i n n I 
h e l d : • • 
Palmer was not advised of his righ t to obtain 
ai :i Independent test, and he now contends that 
the results of the breathalyzer examination 
were therefore inadmissible. The statute, 
however, contains no requirement that: such 
advice be given, and we are not persuaded 
that it is required by any provision of the 
state or federal constitution. • • 
• •- • - i - ; . - ^ . 8 
New y.eKi.c^ . New Mexico has also considered whether 
the law requires that a defendant sr.n; d be informed ot hi s 
a crj 11:1:1 na ] context. 
S:.dte_y! Myers, 00.. . -e* ..^AJ..o 1975). I t: is 
imnortan* * • * •" : . - '-"xim ;:'<•• Utah permits an 
• 1 ] 
much more strongly - , . piov/ies U1.1 -ie persuii tes'-ii: 
shai I_ be_ .^j-yen an opportunity to arrange fnr a r hvs i ai n-:, 
(eiipnasi:- : :**•-:: • "omparisct. 1-. :?. , rw mn . ^iiL.t^ 
"^^
v
" ^ - ' T+^'.tes: "The [arrested] person - - he - -sted 
-1 _ ilia u w n ex{jeiib>: o ..ijllll 
administer " ndependerr; ] res' •- M V *{d) 
Utah _Cqde Ann,, 1953
 a s amended (emphasis added). 
Alaska f s 1 aw, li ke California and Utah, permits a private 
test, but does not require police to inform a defendant as 
condition to administering a government test. 
Notwithstanding this broader language and evidence 
indicating that New Mexico's usual practice was to give such 
a notice, the Supreme Court held a notice was not 
statutorily or constitutionally required. The Court 
reasoned: 
New Mexico's statute does not expressly 
instruct the police or the test administrator 
to warn the suspect. There is no overriding 
constitutional requirement that it must be so 
construed. 
• • * 
We further hold that there is no 
constitutional reason, either state or 
federal, which confers upon the accused a 
right to be expressly told that he has an 
opportunity, under Sec. 64-22-2.9, supra, to 
have additional tests performed by any 
qualified person of his choosing. 
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
Thus, even when it has been the historic practice to 
inform individuals of the privilege to have an independent 
chemical test, the law does not require such a warning. 
Individuals are presumed to know the law and the failure to 
delineate all defense options, such as an opportunity to 
have a private second test, does not result in a denial of 
fundamental fairness or due process. 
Defendant-Buxton has cited no contrary authority and it 
is respectfully submitted that the thoughtful precedence of 
Alaska, California and New Mexico should be followed. 
Results of defendantf s breath test should not be excluded 
under the new proposed exclusionary rule; defendant-Buxton*s 
affirmed. 
PC): N " :: . 
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n F NECESSITY. 
judicially ingraft trie cerense c: necessity L:> r an I.w 
cases, Iiieits cxi s* - ^ o TT+--- - ^ tatuter * :ases that 
recognize this d e i ^ . j ^ - • * - = » . 
on lfc :mp^ . .-. «'. Y *. ' JstificatJc: > suggest: thai thi. 
Cour !:  " -i J ,-: ~ - •.- -. *--. -> ^  .
 i H . ^ ^^^ in,pr^i-r, r Q r c 
unrecoyuxwcw * . . w-^-u»e^ _-. _ 1 
themselves, to sucl .5115= t: uction. 
T juxbioi f
 n.i.. ^ its 
applicatxo. oxiuciLiGiib where an *.i.„, , . ^ .0 coerc 
do an otherwise crimiria.. act because ^ - •"".-> use -r rh: «. •>: 
No S U C H idCt^ -iif- wven suygttb^.. , ' ^s case. Further, 
Utah cas^ I ^ w has rejected the request r.o Ingraft: the 
' ' • - • - - . , : . .. L a t e v , 
Harding , o3 b r . 2a „; -. \ u idh i '^d i. ; ; State v. Turtle , "- ~ V ?,i 1 
6 3^ (Ut.ah 1986); S tate v. Alexander, :-J7 r. 2d 8-; lUtan 
] ). 
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 See -,-.• : '; D: -.i^fendant" :•; Brief: §§76-2-302 and 76-2-401 
Utah Code Anr, '• • 
The commentators also specifically note that the 
defense of compulsion is not the equivalent of the defense 
of "necessity." One such work clearly states: 
. . • With the defense of necessity, the 
pressure must come from the physical forces 
of nature storms, privations) rather than 
from other human beings. (When the pressure 
is from human beings, the defense, if 
applicable, is called duress [or compulsion] 
rather than necessity), 
W. LaFave and Scott Criminal Law, §50, p. 381. 
Under the "justification" defense, the only language 
remotely helpful to defendant-Buxton is §76-2-401(5), which 
allows the defense: 
When the actor's conduct is justified for any 
other reason under the laws of this state. 
Defendant-Buxton cites no Utah "law" to meet this test, 
but simply invites the Court to judicially legislate the 
defense by calling it Utah common-law and by citing a 
"minority" rule followed in New York* Alternatively, he 
argues from a section of the model criminal code and 
commentaries on it, which were not adopted in Utah. 
Rather than assume the legislature intended to adopt 
the non-included "avoidance of evil" or "harm defense," 
appropriate principles of statutory construction require the 
opposite conclusion. If the section on "avoidance of evil" 
See defendant-Buxtonfs brief at p. 13. 
See defendant's brief at p. 11; cf. the model code §3.02 
quoted at p. 11 of defendant's brief with 76-2-401. 
Die: 1:1: :i B " I lecessi ty defer ise" ; ms del i berately excluded from 
the source of U tah1 s criu^ac^ code, i t must be interpreted 
th =it tKe ^^i^la^'j^"'*'^ ripip'ion was i:^en:::r:3i. State v. 
' . 4 0 <<• ^ 
!T+,Vn h-^ briefly j -essed rh^ ^r'lt^ed corr. :r:.- r: ; 
S "C a L E\ tr . I 1 - ci L-. L» I - , l- / L w <z . ^ ^ x L U A . U l,^—,. . , ".wuc,. ^ \ 
the Utah ( curt nct^-i emissions should - -» -: --^ i a: : :;iVf. 
ef fP^* "t^ror?1"1!!^ ?"*_ai" lt-p*^  >-* '"^ ur^ s clearlv can 
revijA t... 
the omission was mad*-* .egisiature anti ;±V^J : ^  , 
mc*a * as adop~~^d and ^cpPt7*1:0 deletions as 
intentionaI -<* rnns1 . . . 
general rule that -' ourr rru.st construe and gxve elrecr 1 D 
t:l le 1 riiiquaqe of - ---'M4-.* -~ - * + - - --^1T^« . vj ow ^he 
I! ,'"' 
words used ;nere±ort,, . ic;:uur. .- . t 
concerning a deleted secticr* : '* i rimir.,-, rod- dees 
r -. • * « • .^.- - •r,?tra4""J *^~:3]it^ve 
intent ayainst his uu^ii.u. . ^^^^ *. - / 
Utah common-law, :i t: was repealed by its exclusion from 
I :.!ns. i ; ; c : :• i i > l]S's A "'"' lf)"" ] '" J ^  • 
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 4..-. respectful ly v.*^ ...*. ^ILJ that if the legisiatur e 
had . * -ended * >rovide for t:ie defense of "necessity"' . ' 
\ i in ! II 11" . u f 
1° 
'-? Corous Juris Secundum 1-, 
this Court to create a defense, which the legislature 
intentionally chose not to do. Constitution of Utah, 
Article V, §1; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 57 P. 1 (Utah 
1899); Smith v. Schwartz, 60 P. 305 (Utah 1899). 
Since 76-2-401 contains no language which recognizes 
the "necessity" defense and does not contain any language to 
support an interpretation which would reasonably allow the 
Court to construe the existence of such a defense, 
defendant-Buxton's claim must be rejected. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MADE OUT THE 
REQUISITE ELEMENTS TO WARRANT SUBMISSION 
OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE TO A JURY. 
Even if this Court recognizes the "necessity" defense 
to a drunk driving offense, the jury verdict should not be 
overturned because the defendant failed to meet his burden 
to establish the prima facie elements of this affirmative 
defense. 
Every state, which recognizes the necessity defense, 
requires essentially the same prima facie elements to be 
factually established by the defendant as an affirmative 
defense, before it may be submitted to the jury. This test 
is not a subjective test; rather it is an objective one 
which the trial judge determines, initially, before 
submitting it to the jury. These elements and points are 
clearly set forth in a well reasoned case from Alaska, as 
follows: 
1. 
significant: evil; 
.-a-r. »n!C" -..jive b**^ * id<?qu.'t'p alternative; 
t:.;.- t;r& ha;*; avoided. Cleveland v. Municipality of 
Anchorage "' '"'"'s >^la^<^, :?-!:. 
The c-1 »:.i.:- • ^ J i c ee t. i i lg til lese 
elements : . c,z determinative; ratr.e: * :>? ~r.al judge is 
*.-,'-„ 3va-Luate r^.o "" ^ r ^ ~5 '^" determn ne I f 
,
 t-. t.,..,.w. . . 1 pxnise * ? :i 13 t n 11 1 dei: 
t h e s e t e s t . - - * .r.nm^r i *:eo ; :* :.'>* L a f a v e & S c o t t 
t - « * « r u n o w s : 
The defendant's brief as to the relative 
harmfulness of the harm avoided and the harm 
done does not control... however. It is for 
the court, not the defendant, to weigh the 
relative harmfulness of the two alternatives; 
to allow the defense the court must conclude 
that the harm done by the defendant in 
choosing the one alternative was less than 
the harm which would have been done if he had 
chosen the other. 
W. LaFave and Scott: Criminal Law, §50 p „ 386, 
Some str;v^ - 11 1 lit",' ii" i i M pI I I * 
example, Colorado s e u i-.ji'.i in Its criminal -^ >:t- ..^ e 
eleipep'c -! -• ! oceduxe of judicial review required before 
t l l e e f e i i s e nil \y lx.' Mil niiiii i \ 1 i M I I I II i 1 1 1 1 y "I ' l l in 1 1 
l a w p : ; v i « i e s : 
( x ,i Unless inconsistent wit other provisions 
of section 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining 
justifiable use of physical force, or with 
some other provision of law, conduct which 
would otherwise constitute an offense is 
justifiable and not criminal when it is 
necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an 
imminent public or private injury which is 
about to occur by reason of a situation 
occasioned or developed through no conduct of 
the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity 
that, according to ordinary standards of 
intelligence and morality, the desirability 
and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly 
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the 
injury sought to be prevented by the statute 
defining the offense in issue. 
(2) The necessity and justifiability of 
conduct under subsection (1) of this section 
shall not rest upon considerations pertaining 
only to the morality and advisability of the 
statute, either in its general application or 
with respect to its application to a 
particular class of cases arising thereunder. 
When evidence relating to the defense of 
justification under this section is offered 
by the defendant, before it is submitted for 
the consideration of the jury, the court 
shall first rule as a matter of law whether 
the claimed facts and circumstances would, if 
established, constitute a justification. 
18-1-702 Colo. Rev. Statutes (1973) (Emphasis added). 
The Colorado court amplified the requirement of this 
judicial review in the case of People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 
(Colo. 1981). Here the Supreme Court of Colorado stated: 
Before the choice of evils defense may be 
invoked, it must first be shown that the 
defendant's conduct was necessitated by a 
specific and imminent threat of injury to his 
person under circumstances which left him no 
reasonable and viable alternative other than 
violation of the law for which he stands 
charged. Moreover, as a condition to the 
admission of evidence relating to the choice 
of evils defense, a proper foundation must be 
laid as indicated by the underlined wording 
in the statute. 
Id. p. 44 (emphasis added). 
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standard, only the element regarding preventing a 
significant evil (hospital transport of an ill person) could 
even be remotely claimed as satisfied. However, even if one 
used the evidence in light most favorable to the defendant-
Buxton, he failed to present a prima facie defense for jury 
consideration. 
For example, the defendant's case clearly does not meet 
the second requirement: "There must have been no adequate 
alternative." The record is undisputed that there were 
other sober drivers present when Mr. Thomas first began to 
have difficulties. (R. 81.) Mr. Goodrich had not consumed 
any alcohol and could drive a car. (R. 87, 90.) As a 
friend of defendant-Buxton, he indicated that he felt he 
could not leave because he had to tend his children, but his 
ex-girlfriend was present and could have looked after the 
children. Also, the defendant, Mr. Buxton (who Mr. Goodrich 
trusted) could have watched the children while Mr. Goodrich 
drove Mr. Thomas to the hospital or Mr. Goodrich could have 
taken the children and the ill person to the hospital. (R. 
89, 90, 92.). 
Additionally, although Mr. Goodrich testified, that 
there was no phone in the house, someone could have used a 
neighbor's phone or one of the numerous phones available to 
summon assistance. (R. 89, 55.) Furthermore, Officer Kirk 
testified there were pedestrians present that evening, any 
one of which could have summoned help or driven the car, if 
phones enioub * * . summon 
ern^rgercy he I; -—*=> Statement ^t Facts N * 
v . * . * -j aciequate al:.e: [i.tt^ve .." *•: m- • 
numerous - -^equa te a . t e m a r i v e s a v a i i a o , e . 
n V > , - > •« -* +" p i r^ j ,ri - } r^ •*- _ 13 t •* v •*" r-\ r~\ ^ •*••*- ^ rn r\ — _ - , p . ' * i ,5 - , * - , 3 v - »' * 
I L L . - d ••' v * O i l U l L t i i l , 
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demonstration that from an objectively reasonable basis 
there existed no reasonable alternative to violating the 
law. 
Similarly it is incumbent upon the defendant to 
establish that the harm caused must not be disproportionate 
to the harm avoided. In the instant case, the defendant-
Buxton chose to drive a car with a breath alcohol content of 
.202, some two and one-half times greater than the statutory 
level of .08. His performance on the field sobriety tests 
and his driving pattern clearly indicates that he was not 
capable of safely operating a motor vehicle. Further, 
evidence of his inability was that he chose to drive an ill 
individual to the hospital while in an intoxicated state, 
rather than phone for help at the nearest phone or have one 
of the non-intoxicated persons present drive to the 
hospital. 
The defendant, not only endangered his own life, but 
that of Mr. Thomas and the lives of numerous pedestrians and 
occupants in other vehicles that were present by running a 
red light and speeding. (R. 21) It is this type of danger 
that has led the legislature to pass and enforce driving 
under the influence laws. The harm of the defendant 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence is 
clearly disproportionate to harm which was to be avoided. 
A careful review of the three requirements essential 
for the defendant to be allowed to submit the defense of 
n i 
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not overturn a jur y verdict where there exists wii.-dess 
error I t stated: 
We revei: s =s :>i: :i 11 y if an er roi: erodes our 
flconfidei ice ii i the outcome", and we conclude 
that absent the error, a different outcome 
was reasonably likely. 
State v. Wareham, supra at p. 15, citing State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
It is respectfully submitted that even reading 
defendant-Buxton's brief in the most favorable light, he has 
failed to overcome the strong presumption of a jury 
verdict's validity. He has not demonstrated that a 
different outcome was reasonably likely. As such, the jury 
verdict should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has raised the argument that he has been 
denied equal protection of the law because he was not given 
a warning that he could have an independent alcohol test, 
while persons who initially refuse to submit to a breath 
test are advised of the availability of an independent test. 
This argument erroneously assumes that persons refusing to 
take the breath test are in the same class as those agreeing 
to take the breath test. Those persons who refuse are 
subject to loss of their driver's license for a period of 
one year, unlike those persons agreeing to submit to the 
test. Furthermore, it is necessary to give an additional 
incentive to submit to the test to those individuals who 
initially refuse the test. 
Defendant's argument must also fail because any "right" 
which may be given to a defendant for an independent blood 
test would only apply in the civil driverfs license 
revocation proceeding and not in the criminal prosecution of 
the defendant for DUI because the statutory authority for an 
independent test is civil and not criminal. 
Even assuming arguendo that a right to an independent 
chemical test exists in a criminal proceeding, the failure 
of a police officer to inform the defendant of this right is 
not a denial of due process. Individuals are presumed to 
know the law and failure to provide notice of all possible 
defenses does not deprive the defendant of due process of 
law. 
The defendant also argues that the trial court should 
have submitted the defense of necessity to the jury. This 
argument must fail for the following reasons: Utah law does 
not recognize the defense of necessity. The Utah 
Legislature has not provided for the defense and it would 
not be within this Court's power to judicially legislate 
such a defense. 
Furthermore, even if this Court did recognize the 
defense of necessity, the defense requires the defendant to 
establish the prima facie elements of the necessity defense. 
The defendant has failed to establish that there was no 
other reasonable alternative and that the harm avoided 
outweighs the harm caused. 
Even if the defense of necessity was submitted to the 
jury, there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of necessity and ample evidence to 
support the conviction for DUI. Therefore, any error which 
may have been committed by the trial court was harmless. 
The verdict of guilty should not be overturned and the 
defendant's conviction should be upheld. 
DATED this < 7 ^ day of May, 1989. 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
/ 
ELD SOBRIETY TESTS: (Describe subject's actions) 
5. . 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? 'x«r—* Subject's ability to follow instructions 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? M t ^ s Where? ^ ^ - S V ' <rz 
WhPn^ %2»M-'*"-> Evidence e^Q^v; ^ - — r S ^ c ^ Q ^ r s N > x . y\N , ^— . 
Person who performed the search ^> v T " W^ fSV*^ 
B. Subject: 
Was subject's, person searchedt^Hi£ i !__ Where? t==!:^:::- ^ ^ ^ ^ < T V _ ^ _ i — — — : 
When? —_ l C r - -__ Evidence Found W > \ s > ; ^ <y^v —u e W c G O ^u^L ^ V C g v L , 
Person who performed the search j p * ^ v ft / 
CHEMICAL TESTS: 
'Mr . or Mrs. t / I : VTTSx , , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) T \ . \V( V ^ - X ' S T ^ >Jt . 
I hereby request that you submit tjLa chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) (jontent of your blood. I 
request that you take a V ^ C ^ W ^ test V 0 x - (^— N ^ . + 
(blood-breath-urine) 
Lr The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presences drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response: 
M ^ " 
Did subject submit to a dnemicaJ test? X ^ ^ * . _ Type of test \ ^ 1 \ ^ ^ 
Test Administered by ^ vA<v^C^r^ -\ ^ A t p r v ^ Where? A ^ ^ *"o 
Time:_2AAlSL: Results ^~2CD~2- _Was subject notified of results? A"C^> 
Serial No. of test machine: ^ ^ - C O U M O 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
• The following admonition-was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, howSvefU^nust warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year wr^uogprovision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physiclan-ai^ur own choice administer 
-a tpst at vnifr own ovnonsp in addition to the one I have requested you to suoTntUo, so long as it does 
